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Abstract 
 
India is a large, heterogeneous and complex nation, with multiple languages, 
religions and ethnicities, and over one billion people. It stands out in having 
held together while sustaining a working democracy for over six decades, at 
relatively low levels of income. An important institutional aspect of 
managing heterogeneity to preserve national unity is the structure of Indian 
federalism. This chapter traces some of the features of Indian federal 
institutions, focusing on their contribution to this ‘holding together.’ It 
reviews the conceptual and analytical underpinnings of the role of federal 
structures in sustaining unity, and summarizes historical developments and 
current institutional structures of the Indian case. It assesses the role of 
federal dimensions of political, administrative and judicial structures in the 
holding together function. It also separately focuses specifically on the 
special treatment of what may be characterized as India’s periphery. 
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1. Introduction 
India is a large, heterogeneous and complex nation, with multiple languages, 
religions and ethnicities, and over one billion people. In some respects, it stands out in its 
political structures, having sustained a working democracy for over six decades at 
relatively low levels of income. It also is distinguished by its institutional richness and 
the relative stability of these institutions (Kapur, 2005). These factors have arguably 
contributed to the survival of Indian democracy, and of the Indian nation itself. One of 
the main institutional aspects of managing heterogeneity to preserve national unity is the 
structure of Indian federalism. In this paper, we trace some of the features of Indian 
federal institutions, focusing on their contribution to this ‘holding together.’ 
 
The key idea that the structure of federalism can have a role in holding together a 
democratic nation has a long history, being found, for example, in the debates over the 
United States constitution. Echoes of these debates, as well as concerns specific to the 
Indian situation, are found in the discussions that shaped India’s own constitutional 
framework. More recently, academics have refined some of the conceptual underpinnings 
for the manner in which federal institutions achieve national ‘togetherness.’  This specific 
aspect of federalism is tied to, and in some sense logically prior to, the many analyses of 
the detailed workings of federalism – including political, administrative and fiscal 
dimensions – which take the holding-together function as a given, or not something that 
places constraints on other objectives, such as distribution and growth, in a federal 
system. Nevertheless, those detailed systemic structures and functioning can also be 
assessed in the light of the ‘holding together’ objective, since they affect its achievement. 
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This paper is structured as follows. We begin in section 2 with a brief literature 
review, in order to provide a conceptual and analytical framework for examining the 
Indian case. In sections 3 and 4, we summarize historical developments and current 
institutional structures, drawing considerably on previous work on this topic. Section 5 
assesses the role of federal dimensions of political, administrative and judicial structures 
in the holding-together function. Section 6 examines fiscal federal institutions and their 
impacts. Section 7 focuses specifically on what may be characterized as India’s 
periphery, and discusses some aspects of special treatment of the periphery. Section 8 is a 
summary conclusion. 
 
2. Conceptual Background 
The key underlying idea of a federal structure is that there are at least two levels 
of sovereignty or authority, a national and one or more subnational levels. In some cases, 
there may be an explicit, voluntary coming together of the constituent units of the federal 
system, and in others, the joining together may be the result of conquest. In either case, if 
subnational units have some kind of option to exit, there is a problem of holding together 
the nation. In fact, this problem exists whether or not the nation has a federal structure 
(with explicitly divided areas of representation and authority). 
 
An explicitly federal structure is supported in cases where political power rests to 
some extent with constituents, and there is a trade-off between economies of scale and 
the desire to satisfy heterogeneous constituent preferences. Several papers explore this 
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kind of trade-off (e.g., Friedman, 1977; Alesina and Spolaore, 1997, 2005; Bolton and 
Roland, 1997; Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg, 2000), looking for equilibrium national 
boundaries, possibly with internal features of federalism. If there are gains from 
cooperation there is a coming together, or a union, which is assumed to be enforceable in 
a static equilibrium. 
 
Building on this literature on the size of nations, de Figueiredo and Weingast (2005) 
extend it in several ways.1 First, they consider a repeated situation, so that cooperation is 
sustained by punishment strategies, even when it would be unstable in a one-time 
interaction: therefore federalism is ‘self-enforcing.’ Hence, federal systems are modeled 
as ‘ongoing concerns,’ and the ‘holding together’ problem is somewhat delinked from the 
issue of coming together. Second, the center is given somewhat broader powers of 
making payments to constituents, in order to maintain their participation in the joint 
system. Finally, they are able to explore a trade-off not only in terms of policy efficiency, 
but also in terms of institutional choice. They show that including a unit in a federation 
that is weaker than existing subnational units requires diluting central power to prevent 
the center exercising ex post opportunism against the weaker unit. The constituent units 
of the federation will therefore choose to include a marginal unit only if the scale benefits 
from its inclusion more than offset the costs associated with dilution of central authority. 
 
                                                 
1 It should be noted that the analysis is motivated by broader concerns about federal structures, including 
the common pool problem, and the issue of the center expanding its authority to overawe the constituent 
units of the federation. See also de Figueiredo, McFaul and Weingast (2007) for an application of these 
ideas to the United States and Russia. 
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The payments by the center to subnational units can be in the form of a pure public 
good such as national defense or the maintenance of a common market. The latter 
interpretation therefore ties in the model of self-enforcing federalism with ideas such as 
market-preserving federalism. Subnational units may find it beneficial to cede power to 
the center (e.g., through a constitution) to increase the center’s ability to provide national 
public goods, but may also want to place limits on this power, in order to restrain the 
center’s ability to punish ‘noncooperative’ units. In applying this analysis to the early 
post-independence United States, and to post-Soviet Russia, the argument is made that in 
the former case, a successful transition was made from a too-weak center to one with 
powers that could support cooperation, while in the Russian case, the center went from 
too weak to too strong to sustain a cooperative outcome. In the latter case, the center’s 
powers to behave opportunistically trigger a noncooperative response from subnational 
units. 
 
 The case of Indian federalism has not really been examined analytically in terms 
of the trade-offs identified in the above models. Rao and Singh (2002, 2005) were among 
the first to explicitly model distributional concerns, though many other papers have 
subsequently followed this path. In these analyses, the focus is on the impact of federal 
institutions on the distribution of gains to cooperation, or other rents generated by the 
system, without seriously examining the underlying issue of whether the cooperation can 
be maintained. Singh (2009) discusses the idea of cooperative federalism in terms of 
distribution of the gains from cooperation among the center and subnational units, and 
applies a theoretical model to the Indian and Chinese cases, but again, the constituent 
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units do not have an exit option in that framework. A partial exception is the discussion 
in Rao and Singh (2005, Chapter 4), where secession threats are linked to center-state 
transfers or assignments of property rights, and the durability of commitments to 
particular subnational units is also examined, both in the Indian context.  
 
All of the above models and analytical discussions are examples of what has been 
termed “transaction-cost politics” (North, 1990; Dixit, 1996), by now a standard approach 
to such issues. Basu (2000, especially Chapter 5) offers an innovative and deeper 
analysis, in which he more fully endogenizes the process of making laws and rules in a 
society. He points out that laws and social norms have, in principle, similar enforceability 
properties, although the different technologies of enforcement may lead to choosing one 
type of rules over the other. Laws provide focal points for choosing among equilibria, 
rather than additional constraints on the societal game or modifications of payoff 
functions. Basu also notes the importance of history, through prior rules and institutions, 
in determining equilibria. The remainder of this paper draws informally on the 
transaction-cost approach, as well as Basu’s “prelude to political economy,” in tracing the 
history and functioning of Indian federalism, and how it has served a “holding together” 
function. 
 
3. Historical Developments 
The origin of many of India’s federal institutions can be found in its history as a 
British colony. At the same time, the circumstances of independence, with its traumatic 
partition of the country, also played a major role in shaping the structure and working of 
 6 
the country’s intergovernmental relations. Furthermore, different ideological positions 
and economic circumstances have also shaped the country’s federal institutions. 
In the 1800s, the British gradually took over a politically fragmented and strife-
ridden subcontinent, culminating in the Government of India Act, 1858. This imposed 
direct sovereignty under the British Crown, implemented through an ad hoc mixture of 
centralized and decentralized administrative structures.  Centralization was reflected in 
the power of the London-based Secretary of State for India, governing through the 
Viceroy, an Executive Council, and a small number of district-level British 
administrators, who exercised all sovereign powers, with no separation of legislative, 
executive and judicial functions.  Decentralization was exemplified by the relationship of 
Indian princely states to the British administration, where they retained considerable 
internal sovereignty. 
As Crown rule was consolidated, the British tried to decentralize based on 
considerations of administrative efficiency.  Municipal governments were introduced in 
the 1860s.  In some cases, sub-national units (“presidencies”) were divided to facilitate 
administration by creating a more manageable span of control; these provinces became 
the basis for India’s main subnational locus of sovereignty. As a nationalist political 
movement grew, the British developed their fiscal structures, motivated by an interplay of 
administrative and political considerations. In 1858, the provincial governments 
depended completely on annual central allocations, since the center had authority over all 
revenue receipts and expenditures.  In 1870, some financial decentralization was begun as 
a prelude to meeting the perceived need for some local self-government. Initially, some 
expenditure categories (e.g., police, health, education) were assigned to the provincial 
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governments, which received annual lump-sum grants, and so had separate budgets.  
Subsequently, further expenditure assignments were devolved to the provinces, along 
with some revenue authority and arrangements for revenue sharing.  
After World War I, the British dealt with the rise of nationalism in a series of 
political and administrative responses, which included federal structures to varying 
degrees. The 1918 Montagu-Chelmsford Report on constitutional reforms articulated a 
vision of India as a decentralized federation. The Government of India Act of 1919, based 
on the report, devolved some authority to the provinces, and nominally restricted the 
powers of the central government over those matters. While the Indian government 
remained essentially unitary, there was some relaxation of central control over provinces 
by separating the subjects of administration and sources of revenue into central and 
provincial jurisdictions.  Provinces received unambiguous control over some sources of 
revenue. The initial proposed assignment of revenue authority would have required 
provincial contributions to fund the central government, but this scheme was quickly 
modified towards greater central fiscal control.   
The Indian Statutory Commission of 1928, headed by Lord Simon, proposed 
sharing of the income tax between the center and the provinces and some innovations in 
taxation.  Subsequently, several committees considered new formulas for distributing 
income tax proceeds between the center and the provinces. The beginning of the 1930s 
was marked by three conferences involving Indian leaders, on the future of India’s 
governance.  These led to the 1935 Government of India Act, which proposed relatively 
loose federal structures.  The 1935 Act provided for the distribution of legislative 
jurisdictions with a three-fold division of powers into Federal, Provincial and Concurrent 
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Lists. The legislature, however, did not have the features of a sovereign legislature, as its 
powers were severely limited. The Act also enabled establishment of Federal Court to 
adjudicate disputes between units of the federation and serve as the Appellate Court on 
constitutional questions.  The Act also provided an assignment of tax authorities and a 
revenue sharing scheme that laid the foundations of fiscal federalism in independent 
India.   
World War II and intensification of the Indian freedom movement overtook the 
implementation of the federal provisions of the 1935 Act.  Partition, along with 
independence, became more likely. While the framers of the Indian Constitution, 
beginning in the Constituent Assembly in 1946, relied heavily on the 1935 Act for a new 
constitutional framework, the chaos of partition strengthened the desire for a strong 
center and to rejection of the Act’s more decentralized aspects of federal structure. 
Jawaharlal Nehru, subsequently India’s first Prime Minister, and B.R. Ambedkar both 
supported a centralized structure. Considerations of peacekeeping, coordination and a 
socialist economic vision all pushed Nehru toward centralization. Ambedkar, the 
Chairman of the Drafting Committee for the Constitution, had a strong preference for a 
unitary form of government.  His conception of federalism was shaped accordingly: a 
division of powers between center and states, but with residuary powers at the center, and 
central ability to impinge severely on the states’ autonomy. 
Centralizing features included provisions for altering states or their boundaries, 
central supersession of state legislatures, and explicit restrictions on state powers.2 
                                                 
2 Another centralizing provision is Article 249, which empowers the upper house of parliament to transfer 
legislative jurisdiction from the states to the center.  While the conditions for doing so are necessity or 
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However, the Constitution did create states with elected governments and fiscal authority.  
This basic fact has permitted Indian federalism to continue. While the political structures 
envisaged in the 1935 Act were largely abandoned in the Constitution, the details of 
assignments of expenditure and revenue authorities, as well as of revenue sharing and 
grants were preserved.  Article 246 provides for a three-fold distribution of power 
(central, state and concurrent), detailed in separate lists in the seventh schedule.    The 
three lists are long and close to exhaustive, but residuary powers are explicitly assigned 
to the center.   
 
4. Current Institutions 
India became independent in August 1947 and a constitutional republic in January 
1950. The Constitution explicitly incorporated a federal structure, with states being 
assigned specified political and fiscal authorities. However, they were not treated as 
independent sovereigns voluntarily joining a federation. Thus, for example, the princely 
states that existed at independence were rapidly absorbed and consolidated into the new 
political structure, with their special status greatly attenuated, and ultimately (by 1970) 
totally removed. As noted, states’ boundaries were not inviolate, and have been 
repeatedly redrawn by unilateral central action, as allowed by the Constitution. India is 
now comprised of 29 states, six “Union Territories” (UTs) and a National Capital 
                                                                                                                                                 
expediency in the national interest, the transfer requires only a two-thirds majority of members present and 
voting.  In any case, Article 250 allows the central legislature to make laws with respect to matters in the 
state list.  Furthermore, Article 353 (b) authorizes Parliament to make laws on matters not explicitly in the 
Union list.  Finally, Article 354 empowers the President to order the suspension of the provisions of 
Articles 268 to 279 relating to transfers of revenues from the center to the states during a proclaimed 
emergency.   
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Territory (NCT), Delhi. The typical Indian state is as populous as a larger European 
country, so is a significant geographic and political unit. 
 
The primary expression of statutory constitutional authority in India comes 
through directly elected parliamentary-style governments at the national and state levels, 
as well as newer directly elected government bodies at various local levels. The national 
parliament has two chambers, one directly elected in single member constituencies, the 
other indirectly elected by state legislators. The Prime Minister and council of ministers, 
rather than the largely ceremonial President, serve as the executive branch. The states 
mostly have single-chamber, directly-elected legislatures, with Chief Ministers in the 
executive role. Each state also has a Governor, nominally appointed by the President, but 
effectively an agent of the Prime Minister. Overlapping political authorities at the central 
and state levels have been dealt with through intra-party bargaining, and, more recently, 
through explicit bargaining and discussion. The Inter-State Council (ISC) was created in 
1990, and has become a forum where some political and economic issues of joint concern 
can be collectively discussed and possibly resolved.3  
 
India’s relative political centralization was also reflected in bureaucratic and 
judicial institutions. The national Indian bureaucracy is provided constitutional 
recognition. There are also provisions for independent bureaucracies in each state. The 
key component of the bureaucracy is the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), whose 
                                                 
3 The ISC includes the Prime Minister, state Chief Ministers, and several central cabinet ministers as 
members. While the ISC is merely advisory, it has formalized collective discussion and approval of several 
important matters impinging on India’s federal arrangements, including tax sharing and inter-state water 
disputes. 
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members are chosen by a centralized process and trained together. They are initially 
assigned to particular states, and may serve varying proportions of their careers at the 
state and national levels. There are various views on the effectiveness of the bureaucracy, 
with increasing concerns about competence and corruption leading to active 
consideration of civil service reform. However, bureaucratic functioning in India is 
relatively transparent and rule-bound, though the traditional economic policy approach 
vested the bureaucracy with considerable discretion.4 
 
The judiciary is a constitutionally distinct branch of government at both national 
and state levels, though the legislative/executive branch exerts influence through 
appointments and budget allocations.  At the local level, IAS members are vested with 
some judicial authority. The Supreme Court, at the top of the judicial hierarchy, has 
powers that include broad original and appellate jurisdiction and the right to rule on the 
constitutionality of laws passed by Parliament. At the state level, below the Supreme 
Court, the High Courts superintend the work of all courts within the state, including 
district and other subordinate courts. 
 
A potentially major change in political institutions was initiated in 1993 when, 
after decades of debate on decentralization, two constitutional amendments (the 73rd and 
74th) gave firmer legal recognition, enhanced political status, and potentially greater 
expenditure responsibilities to urban and rural local governments. The amendments 
reduced state governments’ discretionary control over elections to rural local government 
bodies.  Direct elections to local bodies must now be held every five years, potentially 
                                                 
4 See Singh (2004) for a review of some of these issues. 
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replacing “hierarchy” with “voice” (Hirschman, 1970) as a primary accountability 
mechanism. Local government reform also changed the nature of tax and expenditure 
assignments to local governments by specifying their authority and responsibilities more 
fully and instituting a system of formal state-local transfers modeled on one component 
of the existing center-state system.5  
 
At inception, the Indian Constitution clearly laid out the areas of responsibility of 
the central and state governments, with respect to expenditure authority, revenue-raising 
instruments, and legislation needed to implement either. Expenditure responsibilities are 
specified in separate Union and State Lists, with a Concurrent List covering areas of joint 
authority. Over time, through amendments, these lists have been altered in the direction 
of greater centralization, by expanding some powers in the Union List, and shifting some 
items from the State to the Concurrent List. The nature of the assignment of expenditure 
functions remains typical of federal nations, and broadly fits with economists’ theoretical 
rationale,6 though the breadth of the Concurrent List sometimes creates problems of lack 
of clear responsibility. 
 
Tax powers of these two levels of government are specified in various individual 
articles. The initial constitutional assignment of tax powers in India was based on a 
principle of separation, with tax categories being exclusively assigned either to the center 
                                                 
5 See later in this section for a discussion of intergovernmental transfers. 
6 Economic theories of government are based on the idea that public (non-rival and non-exclusive) goods 
are not well provided by the market mechanism.  In addition, if governments are not perfectly informed and 
intrinsically benevolent, subnational governments may be better able to judge the desired levels of local 
public goods, and, potentially, can be given more specific electoral incentives to do so than national 
governments.  Spillovers and economies of scale work in the direction of favoring centralized provision of 
public goods (see, e.g., Olson, 1986). 
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or to the states.  Most broad-based taxes were assigned to the center, including taxes on 
income and wealth from non-agricultural sources, corporation tax, taxes on production, 
and customs duty. These were often taxes where the revenue potential was greater, 
because of lower collection costs and higher growth elasticities. The center was also 
assigned all residual tax powers. At the subnational level, a long list of taxes was 
constitutionally assigned to the states, but only the tax on the sale of goods has turned out 
to be significant for state revenues.  This narrow effective tax base is largely a result of 
political economy factors (e.g., rural landed interests were initially quite powerful in 
government at the state level) that have eroded or precluded the use of taxes on 
agricultural land or incomes (and of user charges for public irrigation and electricity) by 
state governments.  
 
The situation with respect to local governments is somewhat distinct from the 
center-state division of powers. The 1993 amendments had to leave many legislative 
details to the states, since local government was, and remained, in the State List. There is 
no “Local List,” but the Constitution now includes separate lists of responsibilities and 
powers of rural and urban local governments.7 The lists of local expenditure areas, 
though now broader and more explicit than before the amendments, still overlap 
considerably with the State List, so most local responsibilities are, in practice, concurrent 
responsibilities. Also, the constitutional amendments provided no explicit guidelines for 
revenue authority for local governments. The language of the amendments leaves such 
                                                 
7 The Union, State and Concurrent Lists are in the Seventh Schedule, whereas the new responsibilities of 
rural and urban local governments are in the Eleventh and Twelfth Schedules, added through the 1993 
amendments. 
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assignment up to the states, which are supposed to decide which taxes local bodies may 
levy themselves, and which state-collected taxes are to be assigned to local governments. 
 
 At both the state and local levels, revenue authority falls short of what would 
allow each level to independently meet its expenditure responsibilities. To some extent, 
this is a natural outcome of the different driving forces for assigning revenue authority 
and expenditure responsibility. Most significantly, mobility across jurisdictions increases 
as the size of the jurisdictional unit decreases.  A tax base that is mobile may shrink 
dramatically in response to a tax, making it harder for smaller jurisdictions to raise 
revenue from taxes.  The problem can be characterized as one of tax “capacity”: this 
being lower for states, and still lower for localities.  If this implies that more taxes should 
be collected by the center, there will be a mismatch between revenues and expenditures 
for subnational jurisdictions, to the extent that the latter are relatively better at responding 
to diversity of preferences.8 This is certainly true in India, and is dealt with through 
significant intergovernmental transfers. 
 
From 2010 to 2013, the states on average raised about 39 percent of combined 
government revenues, but incurred about 53 percent of expenditures.9  Transfers from the 
center, including tax-sharing, grants and loans made up most of the difference, with the 
states also borrowing moderately from other sources. There has always been considerable 
variation across the states in their transfer dependence, and the ranking is not completely 
                                                 
8 This problem can be avoided to some extent by coordination of taxes among subnational jurisdictions.  
For example, different states might agree to charge the same minimum sales tax rate or income tax rate.  Or 
the center could impose this coordination of rates: the GST (discussed later in the chapter) takes this 
approach. 
9 These figures are from Finance Commission (2014), Tables 5.4 and 5.5.  
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determined by per capita income. Local governments are even more dependent on 
transfers from higher levels. Data on local government finances remains quite incomplete 
(Finance Commission, 2014), but rural local governments’ own source revenues are 
likely less than 10 percent of their total revenue. Urban local bodies do somewhat better, 
with proportions closer to those of the states, raising over 50 percent of their revenue 
themselves. In aggregate, local government expenditure remains insignificant, 
constituting just about 5 percent of total government spending at all levels. 
 
The large vertical fiscal imbalances between levels of government were not 
unanticipated, and the Constitution created a Finance Commission (FC) to advise on 
center-state transfers. The FC, in turn, served as a model for State Finance Commissions 
(SFCs), mandated by the 1993 local government amendments to make state-local 
transfers. The SFCs were created by individual states, as required by the constitutional 
structure wherein local government is a state subject. Other channels of transfer have also 
existed. The creation of an apparatus of central planning soon after the Constitution was 
ratified led to a complex system of plan transfers, with states having their own plans. The 
planning mechanism was modeled in some ways on the now defunct Soviet system, and 
was finally ended in 2014. In addition, there are various transfers from central and state 
government ministries to lower levels.10 It is convenient to first treat the individual 
channels of center-state transfers, and then discuss the various aspects of state-local 
transfers.  
                                                 
10 Loans to subnational governments can also have a transfer element, when there is a subsidy component, 
or some degree of debt forgiveness. The constitution (Article 293) specifies borrowing rules for state 
governments. States cannot borrow abroad, and they require central government approval for domestic 
borrowing whenever they are in debt to the center. In fact, that condition has prevailed almost invariably, 
since the central government was, until fairly recently, the states’ main source of lending.  
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Finance Commission Transfers 
The Constitution provided for the sharing of the proceeds of certain centrally 
levied taxes (e.g., non-corporate income tax, Article 270; and Union excise duty, Article 
272) with the states, as well as grants to the states from the Consolidated Fund of India 
(under Article 275).  Subsequent constitutional changes (the 88th amendment, passed in 
2000) in this scheme simplified this sharing arrangement, replacing it with an overall 
share of the consolidated fund.  The shares of the center and the states, and their 
allocation among different states are determined by the Finance Commission, appointed 
by the President of India every five years. FC transfers are mostly unconditional in 
nature, though various incentive schemes to promote state-level fiscal discipline have 
been tried in the past two decades.   
 
Fourteen FCs have made recommendations to the central government and, with a 
few exceptions, these have been accepted. The Commissions have developed an elaborate 
methodology for dealing with horizontal (across-state) and vertical fiscal imbalances. In 
particular, the formula for tax devolution is quite complicated, as a result of attempts to 
capture simultaneously disparate or even contradictory factors. The result has been that 
the impact of FC transfers on horizontal equity (equalizing fiscal capacity across states) 
has been limited.11 Despite the ad hoc nature of the tax-sharing formula, its persistence 
                                                 
11 See Rao and Singh (2005) and World Bank (2005). The exception is the so-called ‘special category’ 
states. These are hilly states on India’s borders, with strategic importance as well as cost disabilities in 
public good provision, and they are discussed specifically in section 7 of this paper. Bagchi and 
Chakraborty (2004) provide illustrative calculations of how transfers would need to change to achieve 
greater horizontal equalization for the major states. 
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reflects the nature of precedent that has grown around the FC, even though it is not a 
permanent body, and lacks continuity in its staffing and its analysis.  
 
Planning Commission Transfers 
While the FC decides on tax shares and makes grants, for six decades, a 
completely separate body, the Planning Commission (PC), made grants and loans (in the 
ratio 30:70 for the major states)12 for implementing development plans. As development 
planning gained emphasis, the PC became a major dispenser of such funds to the states, 
and it also coordinated central ministry transfers: almost one-third of center-state 
transfers were made through these channels.  With no specific provision in the 
Constitution for such plan transfers, the central government channeled them under the 
provisions of Article 282, governing miscellaneous transfers.  Before 1969, plan transfers 
were project-based. Subsequently, a consensus formula decided by the National 
Development Council (NDC)13 was used. As in the case of the FC, the PC formula tried 
to aggregate disparate objectives in its calculations, with the result that the overall impact 
was less than clear. In 2014, the PC was shut down and replaced by the NITI Aayog, 
more of a “think tank” than a resource-allocation body. 
 
                                                 
12 The “special category” states – mostly mountainous states on India’s periphery – received a much higher 
proportion (90 percent) of their Plan fund allocations as grants. 
13 The NDC was chaired by the Prime Minister, and its members included all central cabinet ministers, 
Chief Ministers of the states, and members of the PC. Like the ISC, it served as a bargaining and log-
rolling body, though with a much narrower scope. As of this writing (March 2017) it is in the process of 
being subsumed in the NITI Aayog. 
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Central Ministry Transfers 
Various ministries give grants to their counterparts in the states for specified 
projects, either wholly funded by the center (central sector projects) or requiring the 
states to share the cost (centrally sponsored schemes). The ostensible rationale for these 
programs is financing activities that have high inter-state spillovers, or which are merit 
goods (e.g., poverty alleviation and family planning), but they are often driven by pork-
barrel objectives. These projects were supposed to be monitored by the PC, and 
coordinated with the state plans, but both monitoring and coordination have been 
ineffective. There have been over 100 schemes at times, and repeated attempts to 
consolidate them into broad sectoral programs have had limited success. These programs 
have provided the central government with an instrument to actively influence states’ 
spending, replacing discretionary plan transfers in this role. The proliferation of schemes 
may also have increased the bureaucracy’s size and level of control. For all channels of 
center-state transfers, but particularly more discretionary transfers such as ministry 
grants, there is some evidence that political factors influence allocations across states. 
 
State-Local Transfers  
The SFCs have struggled to formulate the principles for sharing or assigning state 
taxes, tolls, and fees and for making grants-in-aid. There remains considerable variation 
in the quality of analysis, methodologies used, and implementation of transfers across the 
different states. Lack of political will at the state level and, perhaps most significantly, 
the states’ own fiscal problems have restricted progress in this dimension. Some states 
were slow to constitute SFCs, or tardy in implementing their recommendations. The 
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outcome has been significant uncertainty, which hampers effective use of funds by local 
governments. Sometimes, SFC recommendations have been largely ignored by state 
governments. Nevertheless, the SFC system has made local government financing more 
transparent.14 However, sometimes supposed transfers to local governments remain under 
the control of state or central government agencies (Rajaraman, 2001). 
 
 
5. Holding Together – Politics, Law and Bureaucracy 
The legacy of the chaos of partition and independence was a very strong emphasis 
on maintaining centralized authority as much as possible. The army and police, both 
trained on British models, played an important role in achieving law and order and 
consolidating the boundaries of the new nation. Meanwhile, the drafting of the 
Constitution created a centralized federal system. Any federal system is subject to 
‘overawing’ (Riker, 1975) of the subnational units by the national government, and this 
was very much the case initially, in India.  
 
In the early years of the republic, the same political party, the Indian National 
Congress (INC), ruled at the center and in the states. The INC was essentially an 
umbrella organization that had pursued a campaign of independence from colonial rule, 
and this nationalist history contributed to its initial near-monopoly of political power. 
Thus, even when there was pushback against centralization from India’s states, these 
                                                 
14 In fact, the problems of uncertainty and arbitrariness in state-local fiscal relations are a heritage of the 
old system of discretionary control, rather than a consequence of reform (Rao and Singh, 2003). Another 
ongoing problem is a lack of consistency in accounting and reporting among the states. See also Finance 
Commission (2004, Chapter 8) and World Bank (2004). 
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issues were resolved within the party hierarchy. Members of the colonial-era Indian Civil 
Service (ICS, precursor of the IAS), including Britons as well as Indians, contributed to 
this centralized stability, since they formed an elite, unified and experienced 
administrative cadre, in contrast to the political leadership, which had little practice in 
day-to-day governance. 
 
Political and bureaucratic centralization was facilitated by key provisions in the 
Constitution. In fact, many centralizing constitutional provisions, governing the relative 
authorities of the center and the states, did not need to be exercised, because other 
avenues sufficed.  In particular, the center was less concerned about explicit transfer of 
powers from the states to itself, or temporary suspension of state powers under 
constitutional provisions, because it was able to exercise political control more directly 
through Article 356 of the Constitution.  This allows the Governor of a state to advise the 
President that the government of the state was unable to carry on “in accordance with the 
provisions of this Constitution”, and allows the President to assume “to himself all or any 
of the functions of the Government of the State”.  In practice, President’s rule means rule 
by the Prime Minister and the ruling party at the center, and provided a direct means to 
exercise central political control, bypassing the electoral will of the people as expressed 
at the state level. 
There are other examples of political and administrative centralization. While 
powers of legislation for the center and states follow the responsibilities assigned in the 
three constitutional lists, there are several broad “escape clauses” which give the national 
parliament the ability to override the states’ authority in special circumstances. 
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Furthermore, the assignment of legislative powers ignores potential conflicts, such as 
when international treaties, the signing of which is a central power, affect state subjects.15 
When conflicts over legislation arise between the center and the states, the Supreme 
Court is the arbiter. The framework of the Constitution favors central authority in such 
cases. In specific issues of center-state relations concerning taxation and property rights, 
the basic centralizing features of the Constitution tilted the Court’s interpretation towards 
the center. The power to amend the Constitution also resides with the national parliament, 
with a weak requirement that just one half of the states ratify the amendment for it to take 
effect. This set of ratifying states could conceivably be the smallest 15, with less than 20 
percent of the population. 
 
The bureaucracy in India has played a crucial role in the country’s governance 
since independence, and this role has been an important aspect of the conflicts over the 
degree of centralization.  In particular, the structure of the IAS, with state IAS officials 
implicitly subordinate to their senior colleagues at the center, in addition to political 
leaders in the state, has facilitated central control. Political centralization of economic 
authority reinforced this effect, since it increased the incentive for state bureaucrats to 
look to the center for decision-making guidance. This situation, in many respects, 
reflected the intention of the framers of the Constitution, carrying on the tradition of the 
colonial ICS as the ‘steel frame’ of the nation. 
 
                                                 
15 Kapur and Mehta (2006, p. 29) give the example of international trade agreements on agriculture, which 
is itself in the State List, while international affairs are in the Union list. 
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The Indian Police Service (IPS), which is the superior officer cadre for the police 
in India, is organized on similar dual lines to the IAS, that is, centralized recruitment and 
bureaucracy. In power and prestige, the IPS follows only the Indian Foreign Service and 
the IAS.  The fact that the IPS is a central bureaucracy, as in the case of the IAS, puts its 
members on a different footing than members of state police forces, and facilitates central 
control. While each state has its own police force, the central government possesses 
several police forces also.  The Central Reserve Police (CRP) was created by legislation 
in 1949, before the division of powers assigned by the Constitution in 1950.  It is meant 
to be used for assisting states in times of large-scale public disorder, and for guarding 
frontiers, and is directed by an inspector general in the central Home Ministry.  Other 
centrally controlled enforcement agencies include the Border Security Force (BSF), and 
the Railway Protection Force.  All these together give the central government 
considerable power over policing, well beyond what might be suggested by the 
constitutional assignment of powers.  In practice, therefore, the center has taken a 
substantial role in the maintenance of law and order, sometimes usurping the states’ 
constitutionally assigned responsibilities in this area. Furthermore, this role has often 
shaded into control or suppression of insurrections, popular protests and secessionist 
movements. 
 
The use of central police forces to aid in the objective of preserving law and order 
as well as national unity is problematic for the federal division of powers, since it erodes 
the authority of the states. However, one can argue that a role for the police in these cases 
is preferable to involving the army. In fact, the army has also been heavily involved in 
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quelling some secessionist movements. Despite this extension of the army’s functioning 
beyond narrow national defense, the armed forces have stayed relatively detached from 
politics, and have not directly sought political power. This forbearance represents a major 
positive feature of Indian democracy. In short, the use of force to preserve national unity 
has been achieved without this force being turned inward on, and destroying or vitiating 
core democratic institutions. One can conjecture that the heterogeneity of India, without a 
single dominant ethnic or linguistic group, has served a constraining role on the armed 
forces.   
 
While the institutional framework has remained relatively unchanged, practice has 
varied with respect to the functioning of the legislative and judicial branches, and of the 
bureaucracy. One can identify changes in the nature of political cohesion and balance as 
the key drivers of this process. In particular, the nationalist coalition encapsulated in the 
immediate post-independence INC eroded over time, with opposition emerging on both 
sides of the ideological spectrum, as well as through smaller parties based on a 
combination of regional and other (class, caste, ethnic) interests. When the INC began to 
lose legislative control in some states, political and constitutional conflicts became more 
open.  The states, which are, by history and by construction, relatively linguistically and 
culturally homogeneous did successfully exert pressure on the center in some cases (for 
example in redrawing state boundaries).16 Often, this pressure was expressed through 
street politics, more in the tradition of the independence movement, than through 
electoral competition.  
                                                 
16 Regional groupings also have led to several UTs on the periphery of the country becoming full-fledged 
states, and to the recent splitting of four large states. The former cases are discussed in Section 8. 
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Periodic attempts to ameliorate open conflicts in center-state relations through the 
appointment of various expert commissions led to some institutional innovations (e.g., 
the creation of the ISC), but not to any fundamental constitutional changes in the federal 
balance. However, the rise of regional parties in the states, which began relatively early 
in India’s post-independence history, but accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s, was in 
many ways a natural evolution of India’s democratic practice toward a situation that 
matched its size and heterogeneity. These regional parties, in addition to dominating 
subnational politics in several states, have also come to hold the balance of power in 
coalitions at the national level. Economic reforms that began in the same decades 
paralleled and accentuated this process of political decentralization. Some aspects of 
these reforms are discussed further in Section 7. In brief, what they did was to loosen 
central controls on economic activity, thereby giving the states more leeway in economic 
policymaking. In turn, this has tended to make state-level assignments more attractive for 
many bureaucrats, and reduced, to some extent, the centralizing effects of the nation’s 
administrative structures. Without being able to quantify a comparison, one can also 
suggest that administrative decentralization has not proceeded as far as the political 
decentralization that has occurred as a combined result of national-level coalition 
governments and economic policy liberalization. 
 
In the last two decades, the Supreme Court also began to exercise more strongly 
its potential power to provide checks and balances on the legislative/executive branch. 
From the perspective of federalism, most important were decisions it made the 1990s, 
 25 
circumscribing the center’s ability to override subnational political authority by means 
such as dismissing state legislatures. In particular, the use of Article 356 was challenged 
more successfully, and its invocation has declined.17 On the other hand, the Supreme 
Court has not articulated any consistent position on the division of powers across levels 
of government. The Court has recently also tended to engage in some forms of judicial 
activism in enforcing laws, even at the local level. These actions replace legislative and 
executive centralization with judicial centralization. However, the cases where the Court 
has ruled involve issues such as pollution and zoning, and do not have significant 
implications for issues of ‘holding together’ through centralization of government. 
 
 
6. Holding Together – Fiscal Federalism 
A key economic aspect of national unity is the existence of a national common 
market. As pointed out by Weingast (1995) in his formulation of market-preserving 
federalism, the center must constrain subnational units to ensure that a national common 
market is sustained. The framers of the Constitution of India were aware of the need for a 
common market, but also included a major escape clause.  Article 301 of the Constitution 
states, “Subject to the other provisions of this part, trade, commerce and intercourse 
throughout the territory of India shall be free.” However, Article 302 empowers 
Parliament to impose restrictions on this freedom in the “public interest” – a term that is 
both very broad and not clearly defined.    
                                                 
17 Brass (1994) argues that the earlier increased use of Article 356 to impose President's Rule in the states 
was a response to increasing political decentralization, rather than an indicator of a movement in the other 
direction. This is not inconsistent with the argument here, which suggests that what Brass highlighted was a 
temporary phenomenon and unsuccessful response in the long run.  
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  In practice, the most significant fiscal impediment to free inter-state trade has 
been the manner in which states levy inter-state sales taxes.  In general, sales taxes have 
been levied by exporting states on the inter-state sale of goods, making the tax origin-
based.  On the other hand, the Constitution’s framers intended that the sales tax system in 
India should be destination based.  While there is no clear theoretical argument for 
choosing one taxation principle over the other, clarity and consistency in tax 
administration are virtues, and these were lost in the evolution of sales taxation in India. 
According to Article 286 of the Constitution, “No law of a state shall impose, or 
authorise the imposition of the tax on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or 
purchase takes place (a) outside the state, or (b) in the course of import of goods into, or 
export of goods out of, the territory of India.”  This principle was gutted very early on. 
Based on the recommendations of a taxation commission in 1953, the Sixth Amendment 
to the Constitution added clauses that enable the central government to levy taxes on 
inter-state transactions. Under these new provisions, the central government authorized 
the states to levy a tax on inter-state sales, subject to a specified ceiling rate (4 percent). 
Furthermore, Entry 52 in the State list empowers the States to levy taxes on the entry of 
goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale, and these have been used liberally. 
This situation has changed piecemeal over the last two decades, and the final change, 
achieving some degree of a common market, will come with the implementation of a 
nationwide Goods and Services Tax (GST).18  
 
                                                 
18 As of this writing (March 2017), the GST is nearing final agreement and implementation, and the 
process of reaching that stage has itself involved detailed bargaining among the center and the states. 
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The arena of intergovernmental transfers has been a major avenue for the center 
to influence state governments – not necessarily to prevent secession, but certainly to buy 
political support. Chhibber (1995) explains the deepening of ‘rent-seeking’ in the 1970s 
and 1980s – including the persistence of the economic policies that make it possible – in 
terms of intensifying needs of political competition. Powers of patronage for electoral 
support became more important, overwhelming any concerns about the economic 
inefficiency of the system. He provides empirical evidence that central loans, food 
assistance and subsidies to the states were all linked to electoral considerations.  
 
Rao and Singh (2005), Kapur and Mehta (2005), and others have argued that large 
payments were directed by the center in the late 1990s to the states (Andhra Pradesh and 
Punjab) from which regional parties that were key coalition partners originated. In this 
case, the political support mechanism was more direct, the objective being to build a 
majority coalition in parliament after elections, whereas in Chhibber’s analysis it derived 
from the pre-election need to mobilize state-level political resources for national 
elections. Rodden and Wilkinson (2004) also find empirical support for the proposition 
that distributive politics in India changed in the 1990s as a result of the shift from single 
party dominance to coalition governments. 
 
Many other studies examine the impact of central government transfers on state-
level policy choices, and mostly find evidence of political motivations in some transfer 
channels.19 Thus, the evidence suggests that the central government tries to influence 
                                                 
19 For example, see Biswas and Marjit, 2005; Rao and Singh, 2002; Arulampalam et al., 2009; Khemani, 
2004, 2007; Purfield, 2004; and Singh and Vasishtha, 2004. 
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voters at the state level through this indirect mechanism.20  Again, most of the states do 
not typically have a credible exit option, but transfers can be seen as aiding the 
achievement of cooperative outcomes, with less severe alternatives to exit serving as 
threat points in bargaining: the models discussed in Section 2 include precisely this sort 
of logic. The peripheral hill states of India are in a somewhat different category, and are 
discussed separately in Section 7. 
 
Other aspects of center-state fiscal relations include implicit transfers, particularly 
through subsidized direct and indirect lending to the states. Rao and Singh (2005, Chapter 
9) attempt to quantify such transfers. Unlike explicit transfers, which are weighted toward 
the poorer states, implicit transfers tend to favor higher-income states. This could be a 
side effect of policies that aim to support investment with higher social returns. However, 
the pattern is consistent with an objective of avoiding conflict with states that may have 
more economic clout in the federation (Rao and Singh, 2002). The ‘holding together’ 
function that is typically served, therefore, is with respect to the political coalition that 
rules at the center, rather than of the federation itself. However, a systematic bias in the 
transfer system against some constituent units could eventually lead to separatist 
pressure. Implicit transfers provide an escape valve in such cases. In one case, that of 
Punjab, such transfers seem to have been driven partly by an explicit separatist 
                                                 
20 One complicating factor for these studies is the de-linking of national and state-level elections, which 
now typically occur at different times, rather than simultaneously, as was the case in the first two decades 
after Indian independence. On the other hand, Khemani (2001) looking at both national and state elections, 
finds evidence that voters reward (punish) governments for good (poor) economic performance, but do so 
more vigilantly at the state versus the national level. This result is consistent with survey evidence, which 
indicates voters look primarily to state governments for provision of many important public goods 
(Chhibber, Shastri and Sisson, 2004). While transfers to, and spending by, local governments have 
increased, they are too small to be a factor in ‘holding together’ the nation, unlike the states. 
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movement. Loans were made to the state for combating this movement, and then later 
forgiven. The resultant transfer represented a special-case compensation for increased 
costs of maintaining law and order, but it is plausible that some of this money was simply 
an additional payout to the state. 
 
 
7. Asymmetries and the Periphery 
 Asymmetric arrangements in Indian federalism have a long history and varied 
motivations. In unifying the country under their rule, the British gave the princely states 
some autonomy. At independence, some individual rulers received differential treatment.    
The Constitution classified the states into four categories.  The provinces directly ruled 
by the British were classified as Part A states.  Those princely states that had a 
relationship with the Government of India based on individual treaties were classified as 
Part B States.  These included the states of Hyderabad, Mysore, Jammu and Kashmir and 
five newly created unions of princely states.21  In the case of Jammu and Kashmir, the 
special powers were given in the terms of accession.  The remaining princely states 
acceding to the union were grouped under Part C states.  Finally, the territories ruled by 
other foreign powers (French and Portuguese) – when eventually absorbed – and areas 
not covered in the above three categories were brought under the direct control of the 
center to form Part D states or Union Territories.  Most of these distinctions eroded fairly 
                                                 
21 In the case of Hyderabad, explicit military force was used to annex the state into the union. Certainly, the 
military power of the center was important in achieving consolidation, even in cases where it was not 
exercised. 
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quickly in the decade after the Constitution came into effect, as state boundaries were 
reorganized, and administrative structures were developed further. 
  
A partial exception to the homogenization of center-state relations was that of 
Jammu and Kashmir, which included several diverse populations and regions, but had an 
overwhelming Muslim majority in the Kashmir valley. The state also bordered the new 
Muslim nation of Pakistan.  The history of the conflict over Kashmir has been written on 
extensively, and remains subject to debate.  For present purposes, we note that the state 
acceded to the Indian Union under very special terms, subsequently incorporated in 
Article 370 of the Constitution.  This article provided the state with a unique position in 
the Indian Union, with its own constitution, a title interpreted as the equivalent of Prime 
Minister for its chief executive, and a special assignment of functional responsibilities.  
Specifically, the jurisdiction of the center was restricted to foreign affairs, defense and 
communications, with the state’s legislature having residuary powers.  This was a striking 
contrast to the situation of other states, where the center’s assignment of responsibilities 
was much more extensive, and where the center retained residuary powers. Eventually, 
however, even Jammu and Kashmir’s special constitutional provisions were eroded.  
 
Another major example of asymmetric arrangements has been the northeastern 
region of India. At independence, this entire region, except the North-Eastern Frontier 
Agency (NEFA) and Sikkim, was administratively part of Assam province. First, several 
union territories were created by separation from Assam, based on cultural and ethnic 
divisions in addition to language differences.  Now, this part of India contains the states 
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of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim and 
Tripura, or over a quarter of the Indian states.  Of these, only Assam has a population 
comparable to other typical Indian states.  Most of these states were upgraded from the 
status of Union Territories,22 this reclassification giving them, at one level, a political 
status equivalent to that of larger states such as Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar 
Pradesh.  Each state carries equal weight in mustering the 50 percent of states required to 
ratify an amendment to the Constitution. 
 
There are various clauses in Article 371 of the Constitution that accord special 
powers to the northeastern states. These provisions have been introduced through 
amendments, typically at the time of conversion of a UT to a state or, in the case of 
Sikkim, after its accession to India.  The safeguards provided to these states through the 
special provisions of Article 371 include respect for customary laws, religious and social 
practices, restrictions on the ownership and transfer of land, and restrictions on the 
migration of non-residents to the state.  State legislatures are typically given final control 
over changes in these provisions. 
 
The eight northeastern states, together with Jammu and Kashmir and the hill 
states of Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand are classified as special category states.  
This terminology originated in the practices of the PC, which gave these states special 
status in dispensing plan assistance. The 11 special category states comprise about six 
percent of India’s population, but contribute about 4.5 percent of its GDP: thus, they are 
                                                 
22 The UTs themselves were mainly created by separation from Assam.  Meghalaya was directly carved out 
of Assam state, while Sikkim was formerly an Indian protectorate.  See, for example, Brass (1994) for a 
chronology. 
 32 
poorer on average than the ‘general category’ states, though none is as poor as Bihar. The 
comparison is heavily influenced by Assam, the poorest of the special category states, 
although, even without Assam, the special category states are less well off than the 
median general category state. The disparity in per capita incomes, however, is much less 
than the compensating disparity in transfers. 
 
The special category states would receive per capita central transfers over four 
times the level received by the general category states. Among the latter group, there is 
relatively minor variation in transfers by state per capita income level. Revenue effort is 
not very different between the two groups of states, so the result of the higher transfers is 
that special category states have much higher per capita government spending. The 
asymmetry in transfer amounts was driven to a large extent by the formulas for plan 
transfers from the center.  First, 30 per cent of the central government’s assistance for 
state plans was earmarked to the special category states, even though their population 
share was only about six percent.  Second, 90 percent of plan assistance to special 
category states was given as grants, with the remaining fraction as loans, whereas the 
proportion of grants in the plan assistance to other states was only 30 percent.  
 
It is possible to rationalize these differences in terms of cost disparities for 
provision of public services, but it is also plausible to argue that higher transfers to the 
states on the periphery have partly reflected inducements not to attempt exit. This 
interpretation is consistent with a history of separatist movements among the peripheral 
special category states. Another reason for the large disparity may be the need for these 
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states to participate more in national defense, but this justification is difficult to 
distinguish from the ‘holding together’ motive.  It is also the case that the small 
populations of this group (especially when Assam is excluded) imply that it is not very 
costly in the aggregate to increase central transfers to the group by relatively large per 
capita amounts. At the same time, the strategic benefits of holding on to the peripheral 
states are very large. These strategic benefits are joined by reputational concerns that 
allowing a loosening of the center’s grip on the periphery could trigger similar demands 
elsewhere in the country. Therefore, one can understand the asymmetries in Indian 
federal structures as providing clear institutional mechanisms, with flexibility as well as 
constraints, to keep the periphery within the Indian union. 
 
  
8. Conclusion 
Since independence, India has performed remarkably well in some respects, given 
its size and heterogeneity. It has stayed politically united, and maintained a robust 
democratic system, now extended to the local level as well. Growth and human 
development, where the nation was an underachiever, have also begun to improve more 
quickly. To some extent, the country’s performance has been determined by a balance of 
interests, regional as well as in other dimensions such as class and caste. At the same 
time, India’s federal system has been important in allowing these disparate interests to 
exercise their preferences. In addition to legislative institutions, administrative structures 
and judicial institutions have been important components of federalism in India.  
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India’s particular balance of federal institutions was heavily affected by a desire 
to hold the nation together. Over time, some of this concern has receded – though with 
continued exceptions in the country’s periphery – and relative political and economic 
centralization have given way to a more truly federal framework, with greater autonomy 
for subnational units. Institutional innovations have been incremental, and in some 
respects have yet to catch up with the new political and economic environment: the 
intergovernmental transfer system, tax system and assignments of expenditure 
responsibilities all are in need of reform (Singh, 2007). An overarching issue may be how 
to reform the institutions that govern bargaining among the center and the states.  The 
national government has responded in various ways to conflicts in the past, with short-
term carrots and sticks, but most effectively with institutional changes that allowed more 
subnational autonomy while preserving the core unity of the nation.  
 
Singh and Srinivasan (2013) have provided several specific suggestions for 
longer-term institutional reform, with a focus on the objective of maintaining high growth 
rates. However, this goal has to be achieved without disrupting the distributional bargain 
that is implicit in the Indian polity. To some extent, political maneuvering in India is 
driven by distributional concerns, not just regional, but also with respect to caste and 
class. One danger is that policies will be enacted that achieve redistribution at the 
expense of growth, as happened in India’s past. India needs institutions for center-state 
cooperation and policymaking that avoid this unnecessary tradeoff. 
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